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T HE survey period has been marked by an average amount of judicial and
legislative activity in marital property law-with several judicial decisions
of significance, though none of really arresting importance.
I. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT
Most of the implications of Francis v. Francis,' which upheld the validity of
contractual property settlements involving periodic postdivorce payments, have
been previously discussed.' In Miller v. Miller it was asserted that the hus-
band's promise to pay the wife periodic payments so long as she remained un-
married was not referrable to any property owned by the spouses and, hence,
failed for lack of consideration. It was part of a property settlement agreement
which included a list of all the property of the spouses which was divided
equally between them. The court construed the contract as entire and wholly
valid.' A better set of facts on which to test the husband's argument would
have been one involving no matrimonial property for division, but substantial
anticipated earning power in the husband. But in some instances equitable
principles may constitute an independent ban to contest as in Andrews v.
Andrews,. in which it was held that a spouse who perpetrates a fraud on the
divorce court by buying a divorce with a property settlement will be denied
*B.A., University of Texas; B.A., B.C.L., M.A., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia
University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
'412 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. 1967).
See Leopold, Contracts for Support of a Spouse After Divorce, The Question of Con-
sideration, TEX. TRIAL LAWYERS F., July-Dec. 1971, at 11; McKnight, Family Law, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 49, 53-54 (1970); McKnight, Matrimonial Property, An-
nual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 129, 136-38 (1968); Smith, Family Law, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 115, 127-28 (1968).
'463 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
4 Assuming that a property settlement agreement which calls for periodic postdivorce
payments is valid, what sort of federal income tax treatment will the payments receive? In
West v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D. Tex. 1971), the former spouses-some-
time Texas residents-were parties to a property settlement agreement which was approved
as a full settlement of all claims between the parties by the Oklahoma court that granted
the former wife a divorce. The agreement required the former husband to pay 121 monthly
installments to his former wife and to transfer to her their home and all the household goods
therein. The suit in question was brought by the former wife and her new husband, Texas
residents, to recover income taxes paid as a result of the Internal Revenue Service's determi-
nation that the plaintiffs received alimony income under the terms of the property settle-
ment agreement, and that the amounts received were includable in the plaintiffs' gross in-
come under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 71. The plaintiffs argued that the payments were
not includable in that they represented the former wife's share of the property jointly ac-
quired during her prior marriage. In finding for the Service, the court characterized the in-
tent of the parties as crucial in determining whether the argument called for alimony pay-
ments or merely a division of jointly acquired property. The plaintiffs simply failed to dem-
onstrate as a matter of fact that the parties to the agreement intended that it be characterized
as a division of the property of the marriage. This kind of problem can be avoided, of course,
by specifying in the agreement the intent of the parties in this regard and determining prior
to the agreement's execution whether the wife will include such payments in her gross income
so that the husband may deduct such payments or whether the payments will be neither in-
cludable nor deductible for either spouse. Cf. Rev. Rul. 71-416, 1971 INT. REV. BULL. No.
38, at 5.
'441 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969), error ref. n.r.e.; cf. Bell v. Bell,
434 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
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equitable relief to attack the settlement. In Miller the court also rejected the
husband's argument that the consideration supporting the periodic payment
was so grossly inadequate that enforcement would be unconscionable.6 Other
cases dealt with matters of pleading and proof in connection with property
settlement disputes,' while two more dealt inferentially with the underlying
criterion for validity. In an aside in Harding v. Harding' Associate Justice
Cadena enunciated the longstanding view that "[the validity of a property
settlement agreement on permanent separation is not dependent on constitu-
tional or statutory authorization.... The only requirement to the validity of
such an agreement is that it be fair and equal."' In refusing an application for
a writ of error in Liston v. Amarillo National Bank,'" however, the Texas
Supreme Court did not disturb the holding of the Amarillo court of civil ap-
peals that the constitutional requirement" of a written partition of community
property must be complied with even if the spouses do not anticipate continued
conjugal relations. This is a substantial break with earlier authority." By way
of dictum the majority of the Amarillo court also evens the score among the
courts of civil appeals with respect to whether a partition may prospectively
cover after-acquired income.
In Busby v. Busby 4 the Texas Supreme Court made it clear that when re-
tirement is voluntary or involuntary and the retirement benefits vest in a spouse
during marriage, they are community property, regardless of whether they are
then received by the pensioner. Two recent cases dealt with common problems
encountered in handling retirement benefits on divorce. In one1' the divorce
6 In Leopold, supra note 2, at 34, it is suggested that "where the consideration noted is
a nominal one, such as $1.00, the issue of adequacy is raised." The writer goes on to argue
that a party may have a valid defense if the consideration for the agreement is grossly inade-
quate. The author suggests some feasible alternatives. Id. at 35.7 Curtis v. Curtis, 473 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971); Andes v. Cagle, 468
S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971), error ref. n.r.e.; Dudley v.
Lawler, 468 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971); Smith v. Smith, 460 S.W.2d 204
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970).
8461 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970).
' Id. at 237. The rule is further discussed with some recent applications of it in Mc-
Knight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 129, 134-36
(1968).
1015 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 58 (Tex. 1971) (Denton, J., not sitting). The court of appeals
decision appears at 464 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970), error ref. n.r.e.,
and is discussed in McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw.
L.J. 34, 43 (1971). A subsequent motion for rehearing of application for writ of error was
also overruled, 15 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 134 (1971). In the court below Denton, C.J., dissented.
464 S.W.2d at 309.
" TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15. The requirements are tracked in TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
tit. 1, § 5.42(a) (1971).
" Cf. Rains v. Wheeler, 76 Tex. 390, 13 S.W. 324 (1890). Denton, C.J., dissenting,
in Amarillo Nat'l Bank v. Liston, 464 S.W.2d 395, 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970),
argued that a statutory partition and a separation agreement are distinguishable.
"The following cases answer affirmatively: Speckels v. Kneip, 170 S.W.2d 255 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1942), error ref.; Corrigan v. Goss, 160 S.W. 652 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1913), error ref. Contra, Amarillo Nat'l Bank v. Liston, 464 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970), error ref. n.r.e.; George v. Reynolds, 53 S.W.2d 490 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1932), error dismissed. The last case is discussed in McKnight, Matri-
monial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 129, 134 n.36 (1968).
14457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970), discussed in McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 40 (1971). The court of appeals decision, 439 S.W.2d
687 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969), is discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 49, 53 (1970).
"Marks v. Marks, 470 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
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court had awarded the wife one-quarter of the husband's naval retirement
benefits. The right to benefits had vested during the marriage, which had ex-
tended over the final fifteen of the husband's twenty-seven years of naval serv-
ice. Though in 1968 the trial court had mistakenly characterized the retirement
benefits as the husband's separate property, the division was held to be within
the proper exercise of its power. In the other case" the employee-husband ac-
quired a vested interest in an employer's retirement benefit plan during mar-
riage. The couple was married in 1939 and divorced in 1966. The husband
commenced his employment in 1941 and retired voluntarily in 1967. No divi-
sion of the benefits was made in the divorce decree. The wife was, therefore,
claiming her right as a tenant in common in the benefits. The court concluded
that the community interest is represented by "the proportion which the benefits
earned during marriage bears to the total benefits earned during the entire
period of employment, represented by the fraction 291/303."'" This conclusion,
though equitable,"6 seems to be a misapplication of Busby." If the interest
under the retirement plan vested during marriage, the wife was entitled to one-
half of that interest. The husband's interest in this plan vested on his attaining
the age of forty-five with ten years of service. The fact that the plan contained
a spendthrift clause was irrelevant since his interest was vested. If the hus-
band's interest in the plan had not vested prior to the divorce, the wife would
have had no interest at all." The Busby analysis is consistent with that found in
the cases on inception of title by adverse possession."
Perhaps the most significant group of recent family property cases were
those which dealt with characterization of personal injury recoveries. This sub-
ject has a long history, both judicial and statutory. The legislation exemplifies
the conviction that the right of personal security has a place in our matrimonial
property system. The first case law is found in Nickerson & Matson v. Nicker-
son." There a woman was allowed to recover as her separate property damages
for false imprisonment suffered during her marriage." The next instance in
point of time was statutory: an act, passed at the legislative session immediately
following the judicial term during which Nickerson was decided, required a
$500 bond of all liquor dealers, and that "they will not sell . . . any ... liquors
"Angott v. Angott, 462 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970).
'1id. at 74.
"For an analysis of the inequitable implications of Busby, see Note, Military Retirement
Benefits as Community Property-Busby v. Busby, 25 Sw. L.J. 340 (1971).
"But cf. Mora v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968), error
dismissed, w.o.j., noted in 22 Sw. L.J. 888 (1969), and compared with Busby in 25 Sw.
L.J. 340, 346-47 (1971).
2 In a recent case a naval officer's wife sued for divorce and alleged that she had a vested
right to a portion of her husband's military retirement benefits. Because she named both
her husband and the federal government as defendants, the case was removed, on the gov-
ernment's motion, to a federal district court. The suit against the government was then dis-
missed for failure to establish its consent to be sued. Arnold v. United States, 331 F. Supp.
42 (S.D. Tex. 1971). See also United States v. Smith, 393 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1968), dis-
cussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44,
45-46 (1969).
"See, e.g., Strong v. Garrett, 148 Tex. 265, 224 S.W.2d 471 (1949); Creamer v. Bris-
coe, 101 Tex. 490, 109 S.W. 911 (1908); Brown v. Foster Lumber Co., 178 S.W. 787
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1915), error ref.
"65 Tex. 281 (1886).
23 One of her captors was her husband at the time. Though the suit was brought after
the marriage was dissolved, suit against the husband was precluded by public policy.
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... to any person after having been notified in writing... by the wife.., of
the person, not to sell to such person; ... which said bond may be sued on at
the instance of any person... aggrieved by the violation of its provisions ... ."'
An action was brought under the statute, and with strong reliance on Nickerson
the wife's recovery of the penalty as her separate property was sustained in
Wright v. Tipton.2 The next instance was again statutory: an act of 1915,'
providing that recovery for a married woman's personal injury was her separate
property. This statute was held to be unconstitutional."7 But in the meantime
the Texas Supreme Court had concluded that a married woman's compensation
in public office might be construed as her separate property if her husband
had forfeited his right to share therein for defalcation in that office; and again
the court relied on Nickerson.' It was thereafter clearly established that a
married woman might maintain an action during or after marriage for her
separate loss for alienation of affections."S The next development was the enact-
ment of a statute in 1967 by which recovery of either spouse for "personal
injuries" was defined as that spouse's separate property "except for any recovery
for loss of earning capacity during marriage."" Several recent cases deal with
this statute."
While some of the problems, especially those in connection with a married
woman's recovery for injury, have been resolved by statutory reform,"2 others
4 Ch. 79, § 4, [1887] Tex. Laws 58, 59, H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 856, 857
(1898).
292 Tex. 28, 46 S.W. 629 (1898).
2 6Ch. 54, § 1, [19151 Tex. Laws 103.
27 Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. High, 129 Tex. 219, 103 S.W.2d 735 (1937); Northern
Tex. Traction Co. v. Hill, 297 S.W. 778 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1927), error ref. For
a vigorous attack on these decisions see Green, The Community Property Defense in Per-
sonal Injury and Death Actions, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 88 (1954); Green, The Texas Death
Act, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 461 (1948). On the other hand, it has been argued that Nickerson
has been tacitly overruled by the cases construing the 1915 act and Arnold v. Leonard, 114
Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925). See Note, Husband and Wife-Suit by Wife for Aliena-
tion of Her Husband's Affections, 10 TEXAS L. REV. 468, 470 (1932).
"
8 Dickson v. Strickland, 114 Tex. 176, 206, 265 S.W. 1012, 1024 (1924). Students
of the subject have come to refer to this decision as "Ma Ferguson's case."
"
2Norris v. Stoneham, 46 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1932), relying on
Nickerson, Burnett v. Cobb, 262 S.W. 826 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1924), several earlier
alienation of affections cases, and Davis v. Davis, 186 S.W. 775 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1916), error dismissed, in which an abandoned wife was allowed to maintain an action for
slander without any determination whether the recovery would be separate or community
property. See also Turner v. Turner, 369 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963), aff'd,
385 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1964), in which the constitutional issue was not even raised on
appeal. There are also several cases involving husbands' suits for alienation of affections.
See, e.g., Lisle v. Lynch, 318 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958), error ref.
n.r.e.30 Ch. 309, § 1, [1967] Tex. Laws 736. The statute was formerly TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 4615 (1968). The drafting of the statute is recounted in McKnight, Personal
Injury as Separate Property-A Legislative History and Analysis of the New Article 4615,
TEX. TRIAL LAWYERS F., Sept.-Oct., 1968, at 7. The statute was reenacted in 1970. Ch.
888, § 6, [1970] Tex. Laws 2733 (codified at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.01(a) (3)
(1971)).
"2 Smith v. Smith & Rowe, 473 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1971); Kirk-
patrick v. Hurst, 472 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1971); Franco v. Graham,
470 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1971), error granted. Smith is discussed
in note 53 infra, while Kirkpatrick and Franco are discussed in the text accompanying notes
50 and 53, respectively, infra. See also Note, The Constitutionality of Article 4615-Personal
Injury Recovery as Separate Property, 25 Sw. L.J. 617 (1971).
2 For example, under the old law as long as the marriage subsisted the husband was the
necessary and proper party to maintain an action for recovery of injury as community prop-
erty. San Antonio Ry. v. Helm, 64 Tex. 147 (1885); Texas Cent. Ry. v. Burnett, 61 Tex.
(Vol. 26
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still remain. If the husband's negligence is a contributing factor to the wife's
injury, and the recovery would be community property, she is precluded from
recovering because the husband would thereby profit by his own wrong to the
extent of his interest in the community recovery.' But quite apart from the
husband's involvement in the injury there is the more basic question of char-
acterization of the recovery; i.e., whether some kinds of loss and compensation
for the loss may be defined as separate property of the injured spouse. This
second matter raises a constitutional question and, therefore, has an important
bearing on the validity of any statute which purports to define separate and
community aspects of a spouse's personal injury recovery, as well as the ap-
plicability of the community property defense in certain instances of contribu-
tory negligence.
Article XVI, section 15 of the Texas Constitution defines the separate prop-
erty of married women as "[aill property, both real and personal, of the wife,
owned or claimed by her before marriage, and that acquired afterward by gift,
devise or descent." There is no correlative definition of community property,
but, by using the same formula to define the husband's separate property, an
application of the disjunctive syllogism renders all other matrimonial property
community in character. Only in this sense is community property defined by
the constitution. Strict construction of the constitutional definition requires that
separate property can be none other than the types mentioned,' though excep-
tions to this conclusion are by no means inconsiderable.' Conversely, com-
munity property cannot include those types of property specifically classified
as separate. Neither the legislature nor the courts may alter the definition; nor
may private individuals except by exchange, gift, or partition-means sanc-
tioned by the courts or the constitution itself.36 But this approach to the consti-
tution has long been regarded as being excessively property oriented-so much
so as not to allow a recovery for violation of a spouse's personal security to be
his or her separate estate." Accordingly, and not surprisingly, the legislature
and the courts have not been unmindful of personal security, as the foregoing
discussion indicates,' but the attempt of the legislature in 1915 to clarify the
general rules of marital property law in this regard was not successful." It was
the objective of the draftsmen of the Matrimonial Property Act of 1967' to
638 (1884); Roberts v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 142 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont), aff'd per curiam, 135 Tex. 289, 143 S.W.2d 79 (1940). This difficulty is now dis-
posed of by TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.22(a) (3) (1971).3 Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. High, 129 Tex. 219, 103 S.W.2d 735 (1937); Northern
Tex. Traction Co. v. Hill, 297 S.W. 778 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1927), error ref. Of
course, if the husband guilty of contributory negligence is acting as his wife's agent inci-
dental to her injury, her recovery, whether separate or community, would be barred since
under agency principles his negligence is imputed to her.
'Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925); Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Tex.
331 (1883).
'See McKnight, Book Review, 46 TEXAS L. REV. 297, 301 n.14 (1967).
3"A constitutional amendment was added in 1948 to allow partition. TEX. CONST. art.
XVI, S 15.
3'See, e.g., Taylor v. Catalon, 155 S.W.2d 965 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1941).
3, See text accompanying notes 22-30 supra.3 Ch. 54, § 1, [1915] Tex. Laws 103; see note 27 supra, and accompanying text.
4 0 Ch. 309, § 1, [19671 Tex. Laws 736, reenacted by ch. 888, § 6, [1970] Tex. Laws
2733 (codified at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.01(a) (3) (1971)). Between enactment
and codification the statute was TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4615 (1968).
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put the matter right-and constitutionally so.4'
The draftsmen of the legislation did not interpret the constitutional definition
of separate property to prohibit what was proposed and enacted. The constitu-
tional definition dates from 1845, when personal rights, or rights of personal
security, were regarded as different in kind from property rights, which are
specifically dealt with in article XVI, section 15 of the constitution. That this
was still true well after the inclusion of that provision in the constitution of
1876 is borne out by subsequent but nearly contemporaneous case lawn and
the text of the constitution itself.' Recovery for personal injury in the sense
here discussed is not an acquisition, but a replacement for loss to the person of
a spouse-replacement of that which a spouse brings into the marriage." In
order to sever out for separate property recovery that part of the injury which
is strictly personal, the act of 1967 provided that the personal part should be
only that which is not a "recovery for loss of earning capacity during mar-
riage." The latter kind of recovery would be community in character. The
Supreme Court of Texas authorized the segregation of separate property re-
covery of damages for a personal loss for false imprisonment,*" and this prece-
dent was followed in dealing with a recovery for alienation of affections." The
legislature had done the same thing in passing the statute of 1887 allowing
married women separate property recovery on a liquor dealer's bond.8 In
Kirkpatrick v. Hurst" the Texas Court of Civil Appeals at Texarkana
held that in charging a jury the trial judge might follow the same course in
severing out the pain and suffering element in an ordinary personal injury
action." As an essential conclusion to its decision the court found the legislative
"' See McKnight, supra note 30, at 7.4 See, e.g., Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Freeman, 57 Tex. 156 (1882).
43 TEx. CONST. art. I, § 13 provides that "[a]ll courts shall be open [to] . . . every per-
son for an injury done him in his land, goods, person or reputation ....
44 This point is well put in Kirkpatrick v. Hurst, 472 S.W.2d 295, 303 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Texarkana 1971):
After an exhaustive review of the many cases concerning whether the damages
to the wife's body are community property or separate property, we are
persuaded that this segment of the damages is her separate property, because
the recovery is not an acquisition of additional assets in the form of damages,
but rather a replacement for the loss of a part of the individual spouse's body
brought into the marriage .... Thus, an injury to the body of either spouse
after marriage is such that leaves it in a diminished condition. The recovery
for this diminished condition is the separate property of the spouse who re-
covers damages for the depleted or diminished condition.
4' The enactment and codification of the statute is traced in note 40 supra.
"Nickerson & Matson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281 (1886); see text accompanying note
22 supra.4 Norris v. Stoneham, 46 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1932); see text ac-
companying note 29 supra.
48Ch. 79, § 4, [1887] Tex. Laws 58, 59, H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 856, 857(1898); see text accompanying notes 24, 25 supra.
411472 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1971).
"°Id. at 304. In the more recent opinion in Smith v. Smith & Rowe, 473 S.W.2d 299
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1971), Justice Ray, again speaking for the same court put the
point succinctly:
[S]uch recoveries would have always been declared to be constitutional if they
had been properly segregated in the submission of special issues to the jury.
The old method [by which the jury was charged on separate damages] . . .
submitted the damage issue in such a manner as to commingle community
damages and separate damages in the same issue, so that the jury's award for
personal injuries included separate property and community property in such
[Vol. 26
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enactment constitutional. The facts of Kirkpatrick occurred prior to the effective
date of the 1967 statute."' In Franco v. Graham" the constitutionality of the
statute was also in issue; the facts arose after its effective date. This was a com-
munity-property-defense case in which the husband's negligence had contributed
to his wife's injury. The court held that the revised statute is materially different
from that enacted in 1915 and is constitutional. The court also held that in
applying the statute to the personal injury of a married woman her "capacity
to perform household duties" would be equated to "earning capacity" referred
to in the statute."2 Medical expenses, the court went on to say, are "elements of
recovery in a personal injury action in the broadest sense, but they are not part
of 'the recovery awarded for personal injuries' as provided by the 1967
statute." 4 If these cases are affirmed by the Texas Supreme Court, a major
objective of the 1967 reform will have been achieved. 5
The rights of minor children to recover damages for personal injuries were
extended in two recent cases. In the first case the defendant-tortfeasor sought
to apply the community property defense to a suit for pain and suffering by
an unemancipated minor child whose parent negligently contributed to the
child's injury. The defense was rejected by the Waco court of civil appeals."
a fashion that the two were not distinguishable and the award was therefore
unconstitutional.
Id. at 302. It was to a general verdict for community recovery that the Texas Supreme Court
referred in Gallagher v. Bowie, 66 Tex. 265, 17 S.W. 407 (1886), just four months after
rendering its decision in Nickerson:
It was held by this court in Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Tex. 331 [1883), that for
personal injuries done to the wife the damages would be community property,
and, generally, properly recoverable only at the suit of the husband. The ele-
ments of damage in such cases have been repeatedly stated in former deci-
sions, and mental suffering has never been excluded from the list.
Id. at 266, 17 S.W. at 407.
472 S.W.2d at 303. Reeves v. Rodriguez, 458 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont 1970), error ref. n.r.e., a community-property-defense case, also arose out of facts
which occurred prior to the effective date of the statute. The court merely held the statute
inapplicable without any discussion of charges which might properly have been given to thejury at that time. In Weatherford v. Elizondo, 52 F.R.D. 122 (S.D. Tex. 1971), a diversity
case, the federal court merely observed by way of dictum that the constitutionality of the
statute was open to question.
'2470 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1971), error granted.
53 Id. at 439. In Smith v. Smith & Rowe, 473 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1971), the court pointed out that "[The earning capacity . . . that is lost during the mar-
riage, and earning capacity lost before marriage is the wife's separate property, as well as her
earning capacity after the marriage is dissolved."
"470 S.W.2d at 438 (emphasis added).
"Few v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 463 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1971), confirmed the ob-jective of TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 4.04 (1971) (formerly TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 4626 (1968)).
"Head v. Coleman, 470 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971), error ref. n.r.e.,
involved the question of whether the parent's contributory negligence should be imputed
to an unemancipared minor child suing for pain and suffering. The Waco court's conclusion
was that the parent's negligence is not imputed to the child, a conclusion consistent with the
Corpus Christi court's handling of Franco. The child's recovery for pain and suffering,
which does not affect earning power during minority, is the child's separate property as dis-
tinguished from his lost earnings which is the community property of his parents. See TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.23 (1971). A similar rule applies with respect to recovery
for medical expenses incurred during a child's minority, though the operation of the rule
does not turn on the character of the recovery. If the parent's negligence contributed to the
injury of the child, this sort of recovery is disallowed on the theory that since the parent
is primarily responsible for the medical expenses of his or her minor child, to allow re-
covery for medical expenses anticipated during minority would be inequitable. Thus, in
Walsh v. Hershey, 472 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971), error filed, an
unemancipated minor was allowed to recover for pain and suffering, but not for future
1972]
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This decision is in keeping with the principle underlying section 5.01(a) (3)
of the Family Code." In Felderhofi v. Felderhoff' an unemancipated minor
child was injured during the course of his employment. His employer was a
partnership in which his father was one of the partners. His father's negligence
was the proximate cause of the child's injury. In the trial court the child's suit
against the partnership resulted in a summary judgment for the defendant. In
reversing and remanding the case, the Texas Supreme Court considerably
weakened the doctrine of parental immunity by drawing a distinction between
negligent injuries incurred during the course of performance of normal parental
duties and those incurred under all other circumstances, e.g., in the course
of business. In the latter case a child may recover. The court overruled earlier
authority that allowed the partnership in which the parent is a partner to avoid
liability by pleading parental immunity." Less violence might have been done
to the doctrine of stare decisis by emphasizing the entity theoryo of Texas
partnerships and limiting the recovery to the assets of the partnership. Because
the court relied on general policy principles, and considering the recent demise
of charitable immunity in Texas, the future of other forms of intrafamily im-
munity is put in doubt."
Though no doubt as to the constitutionality of the community management
statutes has been suggested, their validity was confirmed in a federal case."2
There the husband, who was a resident of New Mexico, sought to recover for
the personal injury of his wife against a resident of Texas in federal court. The
court held that it lacked diversity jurisdiction in that the husband was not a
proper party in interest. The Texas statute clearly gives the injured spouse man-
agement over all recovery for personal injury, whether characterized as separate
or community property; 3 hence, the power to settle a personal injury claim is
in the spouse injured and joinder of the other spouse, which would cause great
inconvenience in cases of marital breakdown, is not required."" But what of the
community element of a personal injury recovery of an abandoning spouse?
This is an unusual circumstance governed in general by prior case law" and
provisions of the Family Code." But no reported Texas appellate case has dealt
medical expenses during minority. Could the same logic be applied with regard to the hus-
band's duty to provide necessaries (e.g., medical care) for his wife so that the wife might
be denied recovery for future medical expenses in those instances in which her husband's
negligence contributes to her personal injury? The analogy is questionable in many respects.
" TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.01(a)(3) (1971).
58473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971).
5 See, e.g., Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954),
error ref.
"See note 75 infra, and accompanying text.
"X In Wallace v. Wallace, 466 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland), judgment set
aside and remanded for settlement per stipulation, 15 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 58 (1971), the court,
relying on Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954),
error ref., held that a parent could not recover for injury due to the ordinary negligence of
an unemancipated minor child.
"'Weatherford v. Elizondo, 52 F.R.D. 122 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
"TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, 5 5.21 (separate property), § 5.22(a) (3) (community
property) (1971).
That a married woman can now sue and be sued without joinder of her husband as
an indispensable party is clear. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, S 4 .04 (a) (1971).
05See, e.g., Zimpelman v. Robb, 53 Tex. 274 (1880).
"The provisions of the 1967 statutes, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 4617, 4618
(1968), were intended to be cumulative of earlier case law. This was specifically provided
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with these particular facts. In a recent Arizona case the Ninth Circuit held that
the abandoned spouse might settle a personal injury claim of the abandoning
spouse on the basis of authorities similar to, but perhaps somewhat broader
than, the Texas holdings." The same result should be reached in Texas, at least
as far as the community property element of the recovery for injury is con-
cerned.
Decisions concerning exemptions from family creditors' claims dealt princi-
pally with assertions of successive homesteads. In Burk Royalty Co. v. Riley"
a judgment was recovered against the husband, and it was properly recorded.
In their subsequent divorce the wife was given the right to occupy the com-
munity home until such time as she should remarry. The wife was also awarded
custody of their child, whom the husband was ordered to support. Six weeks
later she remarried and moved to a rented home with her new husband. There-
after the first husband rented the house to a tenant, remarried, and lived else-
where. Several years later he brought suit to remove the judgment creditor's
cloud from his title. The trial court found that the homestead had been aban-
doned. The husband's admission that he regarded his present dwelling as his
home made it unnecessary to consider the applicability of Speer & Goodnight
v. Sykes,"9 which, short of the husband's admission, had dealt with very similar
circumstances. With respect to the wife's appeal, the authority most nearly in
point is Rancho Oil Co. v. Powell." There a widow was in possession of a rural,
community homestead. After several years she remarried and moved to the
home of her new husband several miles away, but she continued to receive in-
come from the rural property. Under article XVI, section 52 of the Texas
Constitution a widow must "use or occupy" the land to maintain her home-
stead right, and this she was deemed to have done. In Burk the ex-wife asserted
that she never would have left her former home had she not thought that the
divorce court required her to do so. But her intentions, whatever they may have
been, were not decisive of the issue. The second husband had the responsibility
of selecting the homestead for his family, and he had done so. The wife "can-
not prove a homestead for the [second] family by showing the prior existence
of a homestead of the [first] family."'" Rancho Oil was distinguished as a wid-
in the 1969 recodification, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, §§ 5.25(i), 5.86 (1971). See
McKnight, Recodification of Matrimonial Property Law, 29 TEX. B.J. 1000 (1966).
"
7McKinney v. Boyle, 447 F.2d 1091 (9th Cit. 1971).
68475 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. 1972).
9 102 Tex. 451, 119 S.W. 86 (1909). The only significant difference in the facts of
the two cases was that in the earlier case the children actually lived with the father though
their custody had been granted to the mother. The wife later acquired a sheriff's deed to the
land in execution of a judgment against her former husband and sold the land to a third
person. At this point the husband moved back onto the land and claimed his homestead
rights in it. The homestead claim of the husband was sustained by the Texas Supreme
Court. In Burk the husband did not appeal beyond the court of civil appeals.
70142 Tex. 63, 175 S.W.2d 960 (1943).
'475 S.W.2d at 568. In the only other homestead case before the Texas Supreme
Court the court concluded that if the spouses make a conveyance of their homestead but
remain in possession, the property does not lose its homestead character. Sullivan v. Barnett,
471 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. 1971). Hence, if the wife failed to make her separate acknowledg-
ment to the deed as required when the conveyance was made, the conveyance was a nullity.
The wife's separate acknowledgment was required by ch. 41, S 1, [1897] Tex. Laws 41, 10




ow case under section 52, whereas only sections 50 and 51" were applicable
to Burk in that the marriage had been dissolved by divorce.
In Conrad v. Judson7 the Texas Court of Civil Appeals at Dallas dealt with
the assertion of a homestead upon a homestead. After the death of his first wife
the husband continued to operate the community estate of his first marriage
as a partnership with his daughters. The husband remarried, and the home of
the first marriage was sold, and the proceeds were used to buy a new home in
which the husband and his second wife lived. In response to the second wife's
claim of the right to occupy the home as her homestead, the court held that
she was only entitled to a life estate in that portion of the proceeds of sale of
the home in which the decedent had a vested right. 4 A similar result would
seem to follow when the deceased spouse owns a tenancy in common in the
homestead property, though the question has not come before an appellate
court. But with respect to the situation in which the decedent's interest termi-
nates on his death, some doubt may be entertained. This situation would arise
when the decedent held a joint tenancy in the homestead with someone other
than the surviving spouse, or if the decedent and his first wife had made con-
tractual wills to devise the home to their heirs on the death of the survivor.
Though no argument was made to the point in Conrad, it may have been sig-
nificant that during the course of the partnership Texas abandoned the aggre-
gate doctrine of partnership in favor of the entity theory."5 Under the aggregate
theory individual partners were allowed to claim exempt assets as against their
creditors." But the adoption of the entity theory seems to change all this."'
Though there is some authority under the old law that, with the consent of his
partner, one partner might assert a homestead claim in partnership property,"'
under the entity theory the partnership entity could not claim any exemptions
nor could the individual. In this respect the partnership is now like a corpora-
tion."
In Torres v. Torres" a jurisdictional consideration was determinative. After
his first wife's death, the husband remarried and continued to live in the same
home. In his will the husband devised his interest in the home (which was ap-
parently community property of the first marriage) to the children of the first
wife. On the petition of the second wife the probate court ordered the husband's
independent executor to set aside the home to her as her homestead. On appeal
the El Paso court of civil appeals held that the probate court lacked jurisdiction
to so direct the independent executor in the administration of an estate.8' Juris-
7 TEX. CONST. art. XVI, 5§ 50, 51.
11465 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971), error ref. n.r.e.74 The court cited two somewhat analogous cases: Marino v. Lombardo, 277 S.W.2d 749
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1955), error ref. n.r.e.; Clements v. Maury, 50 Tex. Civ. App.
158, 110 S.W. 185 (1908), error ref.
71TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 132(b) (1) (1961), effective Jan. 1, 1962.
7"See, e.g., Phillips v. C. Palomo & Sons, 270 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1959).
"See Johnson & Bateman, Partnership Bankruptcy, in CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TEXAS
558-59 (J. McKnight ed. 1963).
7' Scoggins v. Taylor, 248 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1952), error ref.
"See Nash v. Conaster, 410 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966).
80462 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1970).
"' This position is borne out by earlier cases. See, e.g., Roy v. Whitaker, 92 Tex. 346,
357, 48 S.W. 892, 896 (1898), on -motion for rehearing, 92 Tex. 346, 49 S.W. 367
(1899); Haby v. Fuos, 25 S.W. 1121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
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diction in such a dispute is vested in the district court.8
In Perez v. Campbell8 the United States Supreme Court reversed two earlier
casesM in concluding that a discharge in bankruptcy lifts the ban against lawful
operation of a motor vehicle imposed on a person against whom there is an
unsatisfied judgment for damage done in connection with a road accident under
state law. In Perez an Arizona husband and wife were sued for damages due to
the husband's negligent collision in which the wife was in no sense involved
except that the car driven by the husband was community property. Both de-
fendants confessed judgment with the consequence that both were deprived
of their respective operator's licenses. Both were later discharged as bankrupts.
The judgment discharged them of all claims provable against their estates in-
cluding the judgment. In a five-to-four split the court held that the state law
by which the husband lost his license violated the supremacy clause of the Con-
stitution. The court was unanimous in refusing to apply the statute to the wife."3
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Mit-
chell"8 may have a double impact on the application of federal tax liability to
Texans. Two income tax cases from Louisiana were consolidated for hearing
in Mitchell." Both involved the question of whether a married woman is per-
sonally liable (i.e., out of her separate property) for income taxes on one-half
of the community income even though she realized no benefit thereby. In one
case the marriage had been terminated by divorce prior to which the wife had
renounced her interest in the community, as allowed by Louisiana law, in order
to exonerate her liability for community debts incurred during marriage. In the
other case the marriage was terminated by the death of the husband, but the
wife did not receive any benefits in the community earnings. Under Louisiana
law the wife's share of the community is not an expectancy, but a vested one-
half interest, though all the powers of management of the community are, as
was the fact in both cases here, normally vested in the husband. In fixing lia-
bility on the wife for one-half the taxes due on the community income, the
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Fifth Circuit in both cases. The
Fifth Circuit had considered a similar case from Texas in Ramos v. Commis-
sioner,' in which the court held in favor of the wife in a per curiam opinion
relying on its own opinion in Mitchell. The facts of Ramos were somewhat like
those in both cases before the Supreme Court in Mitchell. Unlike the situation
in both Louisiana cases, however, the community income in Ramos was realized
82 See Griggs v. Brewster, 102 Tex. 588, 62 S.W.2d 980 (1933).
83402 U.S. 637 (1971).
8"Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962); Reitz v. Mealey, 314
U.S. 33 (1941).
8 The Texas counterpart to the Arizona statute in question in Perez is TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 6701 (Supp. 1972). The Texas statute has a similar provision for sus-
pension of a judgment debtor's operator's license.
In a Texas bankruptcy case, In re Gould, Bankruptcy No. 68-H-26 (S.D. Tex. 1971),
a personal property exemption was before the court. It was concluded that insurance policies
purchased by the bankrupt on the lives of his children with the bankrupt's wife as primary
beneficiary are not exempt from creditors' claims under TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
3832a (1966).
88403 U.S. 190 (1971).87 Angello v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 430 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1970); Mitchell v. Com-
missioner, 430 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1970).88429 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1970), noted in 49 TEXAS L. REV. 562 (1971).
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while the spouses were separated. The marriage ultimately ended in divorce, but
after the years during which the taxable income arose, as in Mitchell. The dif-
ferences are not substantial enough, however, to make Ramos of much, if any,
precedential value after Mitchell. Ramos was out of line with the earlier Texas
authorities anyway!"
The further Texas impact of Mitchell is less direct, but perhaps of greater
consequence. In sustaining the lien on the wife's separate property in Mitchell,
the court relied on two Ninth Circuit cases decided in 1970.90 In those cases,
from Washington and Arizona respectively, the Internal Revenue Service was
able to reach a spouse's interest in community property that could not have been
reached by other similarly situated creditors. A long line of cases involving
Texas taxpayers are against the Service on this point." The most recent case
of that line is Broday v. United States," now before the Fifth Circuit. In the
Tenth Circuit, however, the Service was unsuccessful in seeking to recover ex-
cise taxes against a New Mexican husband by asserting a claim against former
community (Western Oil) property that became the wife's separate property
as a result of a property settlement on divorce.' With no New Mexican law
in point, the Tenth Circuit followed the trial court in rejecting the Service's
contention. In a later case the Tenth Circuit concluded that New Mexican law
would not allow an ordinary creditor to recover in such a situation. If the
Fifth Circuit should follow the approach of the Ninth rather than the Tenth
Circuit, an involuntary partition of the community would be achieved. In allow-
ing the Service to recover a specific amount from a community fund subject to
the sole management of one spouse for the sole tax liabilities of the other, an
amount equal to the tax liability discharged would have to become a separate
interest of the spouse having management powers over the community which
is taken in satisfaction of the liability.
"See Payne v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 398 (5th Cit. 1944); Hill v. United States, 32
T.C. 254 (1959); SoRelle v. United States, 22 T.C. 459 (1954).
"United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cit. 1970); In re Ackerman, 424 F.2d
1148 (9th Cir. 1970). Both cases are discussed in McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 50-51 (1971).
"See McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 129,
144 nn.85, 86 (1968), and accompanying text. United States v. Lawrence, 327 F. Supp.
650 (N.D. Tex. 1971), and Lawrence v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 187 (N.D. Tex.
1969), are sequels to an identically styled case of 1967, 265 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Tex. 1967).
"Civil No. 7-490 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
'
3 United States v. Woodard, 444 F.2d 752 (10th Cit. 1971).
"Atlas Corp. v. DeVilliers, 447 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1971). In Texas the tax authorities
would have succeeded on similar facts. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.4 2(c) (1971);
Lindsey v. United States, Civil No. 1-458 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
It is a settled point of federal tax law that state law which designates certain property
exempt from the claims of ordinary creditors does not apply to claims brought by the federal
government to satisfy unpaid taxes. See United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1958).
Nevertheless, in a recent Fifth Circuit case the appellant-taxpayer contended that his gra-
tuitous transfer of exempt realty to a trust for his children could not be construed as a fraud
on tax creditors under applicable Texas law because a transfer of homestead property de-
prives general creditors of nothing, and therefore, could not possibly be considered fraudu-
lent. The evidence demonstrated that the transfer had been made following the appellant's
assessment of over twelve million dollars in federal taxes. The court of appeals relied upon
its decision in Shambaugh v. Seifield, 132 F.2d 345 (5th Cit. 1943), in holding that since
"the Texas homestead exemption does not erect a barrier around a taxpayer's home sturdy
enough to keep out the Commissioner," transfers of exempt property in the face of tax
liability which the taxpayer could not possibly hope to erase in his existing financial condi-




The impact of Mitchell should also be felt in common-law states where
tenancies by the entirety and a vested right to dower and curtesy prevail." The
differences in applying sections 6321 and 7403 of the Internal Revenue Code"
to Texas community property subject to the sole control of one spouse on the
one hand, and a tenancy by the entirety on the other, are not great. In attempt-
ing to collect prenuptial taxes of the wife, for example, the Service may assert
that the wife's interest in Texas community property subject to the sole manage-
ment of the husband is available for payment. The same assertion may be made
in a common-law state with respect to the wife's interest in a tenancy by the
entirety, although it is subject to the husband's sole management. In neither
case can an ordinary creditor of the wife reach her interest in that property.
Although a Texas wife might pass her interest in the property by will, and her
creditors may reach her share at her death, she cannot deal with it inter vivos.
The wife cannot sell her life interest in her half, and if she should die before
her husband without a will, he would take the whole if there is no issue of the
marriage. Property held in ordinary joint tenancies in common-law and com-
munity property states would also be similarly affected. To avoid the injustices
which the other spouse or joint tenant will suffer by forced sale of the property
in question so that the Service can make good its claim, federal legislation of
the sort that was enacted in early 1971 to protect innocent spouses from fraudu-
lent acts of the other spouse should be passed.97
II. LEGISLATIVE ACTION
The legislature at its last regular session gave further attention to community
property management in unusual circumstances of marriage. Effective June 10,
1971, new sections 5.26 and 5.87 were added to the Family Code." These
complement the provisions of sections 5.25 and 5.85," dealing with those un-
usual circumstances when it is desirable that a spouse be given power to manage
community property which under normal circumstances is subject to the man-
agement of the other spouse. The new provisions relate to the situation when
the community property in issue is subject to the sole or joint management of
a spouse who is held as a prisoner of war or is missing in action. Unlike sections
5.25 and 5.85,9° however, the waiting period for commencing the action is
six months rather than sixty days. In the new provisions there are also specific
provisions for appointment and compensation of an attorney ad litem for the
missing spouse. A similar provision might properly be proposed for addition to
sections 5.25, 5.83, and 5.85. °1 The legislature also enacted an unnumbered pro-
vision for the district court's appointment of a receiver of separate property of
Q" See Comment, Federal Lien Provisions and State Law: The Problem of Giving Effect
to Both in the Area of Joint Property Ownership, 25 SW. L.J. 456 (1971).
91 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §5 6321, 7403.
97 See discussion of this legislation in United States v. Maxwell, 330 F. Supp. 1253, 1257
(N.D. Tex. 1971), in which it was held nonretroactive.
"Ch. 884, §§ 1, 2, [1971) Tex. Laws 2711-14.
9"TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. tit. 1, §5 5.25, 5.85 (1971).
100 Id.
Io Id. § 5.25, 5.83, 5.85.
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prisoners of war or spouses missing in action."0' This unnumbered legislative
afterthought might properly find its place in the Probate Code.
103
Amendments to the Probate Code, effective January 1, 1972, also have a
significant impact on matrimonial property law."' Previously enacted provisions
of the Probate Code," provisions of the Family Code,' and extensive case law"'
deal with community management when one spouse is incompetent. The guard-
ianship provisions of the Probate Code" deal with the separate property of
an incompetent spouse, while provisions of the Family Code' and case law".
deal with disposition of the separate homestead of a competent spouse when
the other is incompetent. The rules embodied in those sourses should suffice to
deal with most instances of incompetent spouses. The legislature has, however,
added yet another device to deal with these situations as well as others not in-
volving spouses. This new device is the nonterminable power of attorney."'
The new section 36A of the Probate Code provides that any competent adult
may, by the use of a subscribed writing, designate another as his agent to serve
until such time as the principal terminates the agency or it is terminated by the
appointment and qualification of a guardian for the principal. The provisions
of the Family Code are not referred to by this new statute, which may have the
effect of excluding a competent spouse from utilizing the provisions of sections
5.25, 5.26, 5.85, and 5.87 of the Family Code,"' and possibly sections 5.84 of
the Family Code .' and 157 of the Probate Code,"' as well as related judicial
authority,"' in instances in which an incompetent spouse has created a nonter-
minable agency in a person other than the competent spouse. If the competent
spouse is the nonterminable agent, there would be no reason for utilizing any
of the above-mentioned authorities. The agency statute does not seem to have
any bearing on the operation of sections 5.82 and 5.83 of the Family Code,"'
however.
The new legislation also extends the little-used system of community admini-
stration".' to cover testacy situations (intestacy situations were already covered)
1' Ch. 884, 5 3, [1971] Tex. Laws 2712-14.
'°'It is currently referenced as a note to TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.26 (1971).
"'Ch. 173, § 11-13, 15, [1971] Tex. Laws 981-84, amending TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
5 161-65, 167-68, 177, 234 (1956).
"0'TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 157 (Supp. 1972).
0"0 TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, §§ 5.25, 5.84, 5.85 (1971).
107See, e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Still, 163 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tex-
arkana 1942), error ref.
"08TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 108-27 (1956).
"'1TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, §§ 5.82, 5.83 (1971).
"'See, e.g., Ross v. Tide Water Oil Co., 136 Tex. 66, 145 S.W.2d 1089 (1941).
"'Ch. 173, § 3, [19711 Tex. Laws 971 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 36A
(Supp. 1972)).
"'TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.25-.26, 5.85, 5.87 (1971).
3Id. § 5.84.
114 TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 157 (Supp. 1972).
"' See note 107 supra.
110TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, §§ 5.82, 5.83 (1971).
"1 For a general discussion of this form of administration see M. WOODWARD & E.
SMITH, PROBATE AND DECEDENT'S ESTATES § 570-90 (Texas Practice Series 1971). As
pointed out there, the principal reason for nonuse of this type of administration is the very
broad powers of the administrator and, hence, the lack of availability of bonds to secure
proper adherence to duty. But even if the community administrator cannot dispose of his
share of community assets to his own profit, as the court held in Gray v. Gray, 424 S.W.2d
309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in McKnight, Family
[Vol. 26
1972] MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
when the testator has failed to appoint an executor or the executor appointed
fails to qualify.118 But there is a more significant reform in the revision of sec-
tions 156 and 177 of the Probate Code. This revision deals with postmortem
liability of a deceased spouse's estate and conforms to the pattern of inter vivos
liability set out in section 5.61 of the Family Code.'19 During marriage the
community property subject to a spouse's sole or joint management is subject
to the liabilities incurred by him or her before or during marriage."' The com-
munity property subject to the other spouse's management is also subject to
tortious liability incurred during marriage by a tortfeasor-spouse."' The re-
vision of section 156 of the Probate Code extends liability for nontortious
claims to the deceased spouse's interest in the community property subject to
the management of the other spouse, while liability continues to reach all
property subject to the decedent's inter vivos control."' Nothing is said about
tortious liability of the decedent. If, for example, a married woman is liable
for a negligent act committed during marriage, both what may be the inconse-
quential community assets subject to her management and what may be the
very consequential community assets subject to her husband's control will be
liable in full for the recovery against her."' If she dies, however, the revised
section 156 of the Probate Code .4 could be construed to limit recovery to the
community property subject to her inter vivos management powers and only
one-half of that subject to her husband's control. Further, if she dies before
tortious liability is fixed, it might be argued that liability would be limited to
assets of her estate. As to nontortious claims, the creditors' rights to recover
debts are clearly expanded, since the community property subject to the dece-
dent's sole or joint control is answerable, just as it would be inter vivos, and
the decedent's one-half interest in the other community is also answerable.
Correlative provisions were enacted to revise section 17712 so that it provides
that if a community administrator has not qualified and an executor of the de-
Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 49, 56-57 (1970), his broad powers of dis-
position still make the liability of his surety very onerous. The authority of a community
survivor to convey community assets in cancellation of community debts was recently affirmed
in Jackson v. Genecov, 471 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971). In a recent Texas
Supreme Court decision the rule that heirs at law cannot sue while the estate is still in need
of administration was applied to preclude a son's suit for breach of a lease entered into
by his father. Frazier v. Wynn, 472 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. 1971).
""Ch. 173, § 11, [1971] Tex. Laws 980 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 161
(Supp. 1971) ). "There is as much need for the continuance and economy of a community
administration in such instances [testacy] as in those where the decedent dies intestate." M.
WOODWARD & E. SMITH, supra note 117, § 570.
"19 TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.61 (1971).
...Id. § 5.61(c).
12'Id. § 5.61(d).
122Ch. 173, § 11, [1971] Tex. Laws 980.
"'But the separate property of the husband would not be liable. As recently reiterated
in Henslee v. Alexander, 469 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastdand 1971), the husband
is not liable as his wife's principal merely because she is his wife. There the wife's negligent
act occurred more than two years before the plaintiff's joinder of the wife as a party de-
fendant. The suit against her was therefore not timely brought. In Kirkpatrick v. Hurst, 472
S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1971), the plaintiff-wife asserted a cause of action
with respect to an accident which occurred prior to Jan. 1, 1968, after which date the statute
of limitation is no longer tolled in favor of married women. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 5535 (Supp. 1972). She filed her suit on Jan. 2, 1970. The court held that the
statute of limitations had not run against her.
12 Ch. 173, § 11, [1971] Tex. Laws 980.
2-Ch. 173, § 13, [1971] Tex. Laws 982.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ceased spouse has qualified, the surviving spouse retains control of that com-
munity property subject to his or her inter vivos sole control. Hence, as pro-
vided by section 156,1"6 the deceased spouse's estate will include the decedent's
interest in all of the community, but liability of the decedent will extend to
some property not subject to the control of the decedent's executor or admini-
strator.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
For almost half a century proposals have been before the United States
Congress to amend the federal Constitution to provide that neither the United
States nor any state shall deny equal rights under the law on account of sex.""'
At every regular session of the Texas Legislature for the past decade a similar
proposal has been introduced." On the national level the proposed amendment
was most recently passed by the House of Representatives only to be defeated
in the Senate.' The movement for such an amendment is probably responsible
for the enactment of those portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which
prohibit certain kinds of discrimination in the private sector because of sex.' 0
Nevertheless, no federal statute prohibits the enforcement of state statutes
which discriminate on the basis of sex, such as those originally enacted to pro-
tect women by fixing a maximum hourly work week."'
The pressure put on the Texas Legislature for enactment of such an amend-
ment provided the impetus for matrimonial property law reform and the sub-
sequent recodification and reform of Texas family law in general. 2' As a further
consequence of that pressure, at the last regular session of the Texas Legislature
the statute providing for a maximum number of hours women could work
each week was repealed."' By a unanimous vote of the Senate and a large ma-
jority in the House of Representatives the amendment against sex discrimina-
tion was finally passed and will be submitted to the people in November
12"Ch. 173, § 11, [1971] Tex. Laws 980.
".. For a discussion of the question of the necessity of such an amendment see generally
Equal Rights for Women: A Symposium on the Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 6
HARV. Civ. RT.-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 215 (1971).
"' See note 134 infra, and accompanying text.
"'See Annot., 27 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1971).
"' Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 266 (codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(d), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a to 2000d-4, 2000e to 2000h-6 (1964)).
Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was recently applied in Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971), which held that a hiring policy which discriminates
on the basis of sex when job applicants have pre-school-age children was unlawful in the
absence of some demonstration that such circumstances affect the job performance of women
more adversely than the job performance of men. With reference to wage discrimination
on the basis of sex, two separate decisions by the Fifth Circuit, though both decisions arose
out of the same case, indicate that inequality in work assignments may justify differences in
pay while differences based upon a "bona fide training program" may not. Compare Schultz
v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969), with Hodgson v. First Victoria
Nat'l Bank, 446 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1971).
"' It has been held that the equal protection clause does not prohibit such legislation.
See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). But see note 144 infra, and accompanying
text. 32 See McKnight, Texas Community Property Law-Its Course of Development and
Reform, 8 CAL. W.L. REV. 117, 127-29 (1971).
"3'TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5172a (Supp. 1972) in effect repealed by ch. 473,
1, [1971) Tex. Laws 1671, effective Aug. 30, 1971. But cf. art. 5172a, S 3, read in con-
junction with § 1 (Supp. 1972) with art. 5172a, §§ 5 and 1 (1971).
[Vol. 26
MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
1972." To make the amendment more palatable, the form in which it was
offered was revised in 1967 to forbid, in addition to discrimination because of
sex, that based on color, race, creed, or national origin. Though this seeming
change of emphasis may both help and harm the amendment at the polls, the
additional language is largely surplusage, since the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments to the federal Constitution have been construed to authorize legis-
lation to deal with state discrimination on the basis of race or color, though
none of the post-civil war amendments deals specifically with "creed" or "nation-
al origin."" The most significant issue before the Texas voter is whether he
wishes to insert in the Texas Constitution a prohibition against discrimination
under state laws on account of sex.
What effect would the adoption of such an amendment, whether to the fed-
eral or state constitution, have on Texas law? Those existing discriminations
and future ones that may be instituted which treat all men differently from
all women, and vice versa, would certainly fall. It would usually follow that
the better condition would have to apply for the sex discriminated against.
There are relatively few discriminatory Texas laws of this sort. In the field of
labor law employers of women are required to provide for certain amenities
not required for male employees."' If the amendment is adopted, the employers
of males would probably have to provide these additional facilities. Though
the Family Law Section has recommended uniformity of age for males and
females who may be declared juvenile delinquents, as the law now stands a
male may not be treated as a delinquent child after he becomes seventeen years
of age,'37 and a female may be adjudicated a delinquent until she completes
her eighteenth year." The effect of the amendment would presumably impose
uniformity by adopting the age presently laid down for females. An age differ-
ence is also provided for the minimum age at which males and females can
marry: males at sixteen and females at fourteen.'39 Parental consent is required
of males under nineteen and of females under eighteen.4 ' In both of these
instances the rules of age for females, because they are more liberal, would
apply to males. Finally, assault by a male on a female is aggravated under
Texas law, whereas an assault by a female on a male is merely simple assault."'
"m S.J. Res. 16, [1971] Tex. Laws 4129. The question was put to a referendum by the
State Bar of Texas in 1964 and the amendment was defeated by a ratio of two-to-one of those
voting. See 27 TEX. B.J. 227 (1964). Following this mandate bar leaders testified against
the proposed amendment in succeeding legislative sessions until that of 1971, when the
measure was unopposed by the organized bar.
-5See also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3, authorizing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
6252-16 (Supp. 1972), which prohibits state officers from discriminating on the basis of
race, religion, color, sex, or national origin with regard to employment or use of public
facilities.
13 See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5172a, § 2 (seats), 5176 (exits, stairways,
lighting), 5177 (toilets), 5178 (freedom from immoral influences) (Supp. 1972).
' 'TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 3 (1971).
138 Id.
'
39 TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.51(a) (1971).14 1d. § 1.52(a).
14'TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1147 (Supp. 1972). It is difficult to classify id. art.
734a, § 4 (Supp. 1972) in terms of sexual discrimination. This provision of the Texas
barber law requires that hairdressers and cosmetologists are "not permitted to shave, trim the
beard, style, process, color or cut the hair of male persons" except in accordance with the
barber law. (Emphasis added.) Though both males and females may qualify as both barbers
on the one hand and hairdressers and cosmetologists on the other, the inclusion of "shop
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With respect to married persons differences in rights and duties are attribu-
table to the fact that they are married rather than to sex.' But others have
argued that such differences are based on sex, that, for example, a state's vest-
ing in one spouse management of community property to the exclusion of the
other constitutes a sexual discrimination." The recent United States Supreme
Court decision in Reed v. Reed1" may have the political effect of lifting the
pressure on Congress to submit the amendment to the states as well as the
legal effect of helping to resolve the meaning of the amendment to the Texas
Constitution if it is adopted. In Reed the court considered the constitutionality
of Idaho law," which prefers male relatives over females of the same class in
the appointment of an administrator for a decedent's estate. The father and
mother are in the same class, but the statute directs that in such an instance
males are to be preferred. The Supreme Court struck down the statute as un-
constitutional under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment in
that the clause denies to the states:
the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed
by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the
objective of that statute .... Clearly the objective of reducing the workload on
probate courts by eliminating one class of contests is not without some legiti-
macy .... [But] [tjo give a mandatory preference to members of either sex
over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings
on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden
by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and whatever
may be said as to the positive values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the
choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of
sex.... By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus
similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause.' "
If, as is suggested elsewhere,""7 a state law would be unconstitutional under the
proposed equal rights amendment if it had the effect of treating husband and
wife differently, would the same result follow under the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the equal protection clause? As amended in 1967, Texas matri-
monial property statutes have only one disparity of treatment between husband
and wife, and that is with respect to the duty of support.'4 But there are many
boys" in the definition of "barber," without reference to a female equivalent, may amount
to a scintilla of sexual discrimination. Id. art. 728 (1961).
"See McKnight, Liability of Separate and Community Property for Obligations of
Spouses to Strangers, in CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TEXAS 330-31 (J. McKnight ed. 1963). A
short study of the legal condition of married women in historical perspective is found in
L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW, THE UNFINISHED REVOLuTION 35 passim (1969).
... See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitu-
tional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 947 (1971).
14492 S. Ct. 251 (1971).
14 IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 15-312, -314 (repealed effective July 1, 1972).
14 92 S. Ct. at 254.
147 Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 143, at 947.
4'4 TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 4.02 (1971). Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman,
supra note 143, at 947-48, suggest that the provision for control of community property is
another possible sexual discrimination because the bulk of the community will usually be
under the control of the husband. If there is any substance in this view, it constitutes an
assault on the prevailing state of affairs in all common-law matrimonial property states, as
the authors point out.
Though not statutory, there is also the principle that when the "husband and wife are
living together, it is the husband who, as head of that family, selects its homestead." Burk
Royalty Co. v. Riley, 475 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. 1972). "Though times may change the
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more differences in other community property states. A very real threat to the
community property system may be inherent in the adoption of either the
federal or the state constitutional amendment: husbands could assert that they
are discriminated against when they must share half their earnings and half
the income from their separate estates with their wives who produce no mone-
tary income.
There are also differences in treatment of Texas spouses with respect to
criminal law and the law of torts. It is often said that the husband may recover
for loss of consortium and the wife may not,"9 though no reported decision
appears to enunciate this proposition.15 The husband, but not the wife, is also
allowed to revenge his conjugal honor by killing his wife's paramour when
she is taken in adultery and without the risk of being convicted for murder.
It is justifiable homicide."5 ' The ultimate inequality that may be attributable
frequency with which the traditional presumption may be overcome by the circumstances
of a particular family, the presumption that the husband is the head of the family con-
tinues." Id. at 569.
'" This can only be explained historically: a consequence of the English rule that the
wife is sub virga viri sui and owes a duty of service to her husband, while the wife has no
reciprocal right to her husband's services. See Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30
COLUM. L. REv, 651, 653 (1930). An analysis more consistent with traditional Texas con-
cepts is laid down in Gainesville, H. & W. Ry. v. Lacy, 86 Tex. 244, 248-49, 24 S.W. 269,
271 (1893):
The term 'service,' as used at common law in relation to the labor performed
and rendered by a wife, does not properly represent the dignity of the wife's
work as a member of the matrimonial partnership, in Texas. She no more
owes service to the husband than he to her. Her duties are those of a wife, and
are not to be valued as that of a servant or hireling. The fruits of her labor
belong to the community, as do those of the husband, and the same rules that
apply to the one under like circumstances apply to the other.
In commenting on Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), which allowed
a wife to recover for loss of consortium, a student writer in Note, Torts-Loss of Consortium
Through Negligence--Right of Wife To Recover, 29 TEXAs L. REv. 693, 694 (1951),
concludes "that when a wife has been negligently injured the community recovers for the
loss of the wife's consortium beyond the economic elements. Her household services . .
include her 'aid, assistance, comfort and society,' " citing Gainesville, H. & W. Ry. v. Lacy,
supra. But neither that case nor Dallas v. Jones, 54 S.W. 606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898),
rev'd on other grounds, 93 Tex. 38, 49 S.W. 577 (1899), supports this analysis. Recovery
for loss of "comfort and society" should be characterized as the separate property of the
plaintiff-spouse, while a recovery for loss of earnings or future earning power or impair-
ment of a spouse's ability to manage the household is community in character.
" Most American jurisdictions deny the wife a right to recovery for loss of consortium
due to negligence, but some allow recovery for loss of consortium incident to intentional
torts in general. For a collection of authorities see Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1378 (1952). The
wife's right to recover for alienation of affections is generally recognized, however. The
Texas authorities on alienation of affections and criminal conversation are discussed in Com-
ment, Piracy on the Matrimonial Seas-The Law and the Marital Interloper, 25 Sw. L.J.
594 (1971). The husband's right to recover for alienation of affections is established in
Texas, but the authorities do not characterize the recovery as separate or community prop-
erty. See Lisle v. Lynch, 318 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958), error ref.
,.ure.
151 TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1220 (1961). This rule is probably a survival of Spanish
legal tradition in Texas. LAs SIETE PARTIDAS pt. 3, tit. 14, law 12 (1265), provides that
should the husband suspect his wife of adultery, he must three times give the paramour
notice to stay away before taking violent action against him. The law further specifies how
the warnings are to be given. Id. pt. 7, tit. 17, law 12. But if the husband discovers the wife
and her paramour in adultery, no warning is necessary. Id. pt. 7, tit. 17, law 13. The para-
mour has waived his right to due process, so to speak. Later Spanish codes, N. RECOP. bk.
8, tit. 20, law 1 (1567); Nov. REcop. bk. 12, tit. 28, law 1 (1805); and the FUERO REAL
bk. 4, tit. 7, law 1 (1255), go back to an earlier and tougher approach. FUERO JUZGo bk.
3, tit. 4, law 1 (693), provides that the husband can deal with the adulterer and the adul-
teress as he wishes. A thirteenth century proviso stated, however, that he cannot kill one
without killing the other. FuERo REAL bk. 4, tit. 7, law 1 (1255). This Spanish tradition
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to sex occurs in this case, of course, when the adulterer may be lawfully killed,
while the adulteress may not."'
seems to have been the basis for the Texas statute adopted in 1856. An Act To Adopt and
Establish a Penal Code for the State of Texas, § 1, tit. 27, ch. 10, art. 562, [18561 Tex. Pen.
Code 110 (1857). For a brief account of the rule in colonial Louisiana see McCurdy, A
Legal Revival of Pundonor in Spanish Louisiana, 33 HISPANIA 30 (1950). Utah and the
former Spanish province of New Mexico still have similar rules. UTAH CODE ANN. 5
76-30-10 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-8 (1953). The old Georgia rule is in general
terms and seemingly operates on behalf of wives as well as husbands, though a nice distinc-
tion is drawn there between a killing to prevent sexual relations (justified) and one moti-
vated by passion alone (manslaughter). GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1016 (1953). It is perhaps
significant that James Willie, the principal draftsman of the Texas Code of 1856, was a
native of Georgia. English law did not treat the husband's act as justifiable homicide, but
rather as manslaughter. Blackstone points out, however, that it was the lowest degree of
manslaughter, and a first offender would be branded on the hand for his offense--"the burn-
ing in the hand to be gently inflicted because there could be no greater provocation." 1 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *444-45.
... If the husband kills the wife too, though by mistake, such killing is construed as
murder without malice-i.e., voluntary manslaughter in common-law parlance. As the late
Professor Stumberg pointed out, unlike burglars, robbers, and murderers, the paramour gets
a "sporting chance" to fight back, and his killing of the outraged husband is also treated as
murder without malice. See Stumberg, Defense of Person and Property Under Texas Crim-
inal Law, 21 TEXAS L. REv. 17, 18-19 (1942). See also TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 32
(1952) which provides for a reduced punishment for married women who commit offenses
at the instigation of their husbands. For the increased punishment of the instigating hus-
band see TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 33 (1952).
